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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN DIANE ANDERSON BAGGS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DENNIS R. ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to domesticate a Wyoming divorce 
decree and obtain judgment for support arrearages there-
under. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment 
for plaintiff, later modified, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks judgment for all support arrearages 
as a matter of law, and attorney's fees, or that failing, a 
new trial. 
Case No. 
13422 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 24, 1970, plaintiff and defendant were di-
vorced in Natrona County, Wyoming. Plaintiff was 
awarded custody of the three minor children of the par-
ties, and defendant was directed to pay the sum of $200.00 
per month for support of said children. Defendant made 
those payments through September, 1971. During parts 
of September and October, 1971, plaintiff was taken ill. 
As a result of lost work, she was in desperate economic 
condition and contacted defendant inquiring of the Oc-
tober payment and advising him of her difficulty. T. 10-
12. Plaintiff called defendant several times during the 
month of October, and finally he agreed to make up the 
October payment and make the November payment if 
she would meet with him on November 1, 1971. T. 12, 
L. 8-20. At that time defendant paid $400.00 and prom-
ised to make a $200.00 payment for December, 1971, in 
return for plaintiff relieving him from further support 
obligations. T. 12, L. 18-20; T. 193, L. 26-30; T. 194, L. 
1-4. Plaintiff had no intention of relieving him from his 
obligation, but signed the agreement simply to get the 
money she needed so badly. T. 13, L. 2-21. About two 
weeks later, defendant agreed with plaintiff's fiance, Mr. 
Ritchie Baggs, that he would allow Mr. Baggs to adopt 
the children but was not giving anything else. T. 14, L. 
9-17. Plaintiff and Mr. Baggs were married November 
19, 1971, defendant paid $100.00 toward his obligation for 
December, 1971, and no further payments were made. 
At no time were the support arrearages used as a lever 
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to compel adoption or vice-versa, T. 68, L. 22-30; T. 69, 
L. 1-20. 
As a result of Mr. Baggs' employment, it was neces-
sary for him to be away for three months beginning March 
6, 1972, and plaintiff was apprehensive that defendant 
may make things difficult for her with Mr. Baggs away. 
T. 15, L. 15; T. 15-16, L. 30, 1-4. Accordingly, plaintiff 
and Mr. Baggs determined to forego any action against 
defendant until they could be together to the outcome. 
T. 41, L. 19-22. Upon Mr. Baggs' return, he consulted 
counsel to proceed to adopt the children, T. 41-43. When 
defendant refused to proceed with the adoption, plaintiff 
felt he should make up support payments, T. 16, L. 10-30, 
and defendant was made aware of plaintiff's demand for 
support payments on July 17, 1972. Formal demand was 
made on defendant July 25, 1972, which he acknowledged 
and refused. Formal demand was again made September 
14, 1972, whereupon defendant agreed to begin payments 
and make up arrearages, Record on Appeal P. 44, Pre-
Trial Order pp. 52-54. On September 27, 1972, plaintiff 
filed a complaint against defendant seeking to domesticate 
the Wyoming decree and obtain an order directing de-
fendant to pay support arrearages. Further negotiations 
were conducted until December 14, 1972, when defendant 
was served. On January 5, 1973, Default Judgment was 
entered against defendant, said judgment being set aside 
February 20, 1973. 
On May 8, 1973, trial was held, the Wyoming de-
cree was domesticated, and plaintiff was granted judg-
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ment for all support arrearages (emphasis added) on 
May 25, 1973, Record on Appeal 55-56. On May 31, 1973, 
defendant moved for amendment of judgment which was 
heard on June 20, 1973. On June 29, 1973, the court 
amended its judgment, disallowing support arrearages 
from December, 1972, through July, 1973, fifty-two (52) 
days after trial (emphasis added). Plaintiff's motions for 
reconsideration were denied on July 30, 1973. 
In the meantime, defendant was earning $700.00 per 
month through June, 1972, $908.00 per month through 
November, 1972, and $1,066.00 per month from December, 
1972, to trial, May 8, 1973, and has no other dependents. 
T. 59, L. 10-30; T. 60, L. 1-5. He borrowed money before 
the November 1, 1971 agreement to pay Mrs. Baggs. T. 
64. L, 12-20 (emphasis added). Following the agreement 
he borrowed money for new furniture to be repaid at 
$25.60 per month, T. 65, L. 13-16. "Later on" during the 
summer of 1972 he purchased a new automobile for 
$3,750.00 to be repaid at $118.00 per month. T. 54, L. 7; 
T. 64, L. 1-9. He further moved to a $175.00 per month 
apartment from a $40.00 per month apartment. After he 
became aware of plaintiff's demands for support arrear-
ages he again borrowed $1,200.00, T. 64, L. 21-30; T. 66, 
L. 1-5. Thus, from November 1, 1971, to July, 1972, de-
fendant obligated himself for only $278.60 per month, 
while making from $700.00 - $1,066.00 per month (empha-
sis added). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE NOVEMBER 1,1971 AGREEMENT DID 
NOT RELIEVE D E F E N D A N T OF HIS 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
First, the agreement is not a valid contract. As noted 
in plaintiff's affidavit, as well as her testimony, the agree-
ment was extorted from her under duress and thus ren-
dered voidable. T. 13, L. 2-21, Record on Appeal 33-
34. Further, it is clear from the affidavits, testimony, and 
pleadings on file, that plaintiff at no time ratified the 
agreement. 
The agreement must fail for lack of consideration. 
I t is well established that "neither doing nor promising 
to do any act which one is already legally bound to the 
promise to do, will furnish sufficient consideration for 
the counter promise." Simpson on Contracts §58. In the 
instant case, defendant promises to do absolutely nothing 
he was not already legally bound to do, as he owed plain-
tiff $400.00 on the date of the agreement, and would owe 
her $200.00 for December, 1971, when the $200.00 pay-
ment was due under the agreement. T. 62, L. 26-30. 
Second, the agreement should not be enforced as it 
is contrary to Utah law. Under Utah law, a release from 
the wife of all support obligations is of no effect, since 
future support cannot be the subject of a bargain and 
sale between husband and wife. Price v. Price, 4 U. 2d 
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153 (1955), affirmed, McClure v. Dowell, 15 U. 2d 324 
(1964); French v. Johnson, 16 U. 2d 360 (1965). See also 
Ditmar v. Ditmar, (Wash.) 293 P. 2d 759 (1956). 
No cases decided under Utah law, particularly Larsen 
v. Larsen, 5 U. 2d 224 (1956), which purported to apply 
an estoppel theory to accumulated support arrearages, 
stand for the proposition that future payments can be bar-
gained away. In the instant case, defendant is relying 
on an agreement which related in no way to arrearages, 
but to future payments. 
The proposition that future payments may not be 
released is well established in other judisdictions, Cer-
vantes v. Cervantes, 203 S. W. 2d 143 (1947), and Kelly 
v. Kelly, 47 S. W. 2d 762 (1932). 
It is apparent that the agreement is not even a valid 
contract and wholly unenforceable between the parties. 
But even if the court finds the agreement has some kind 
of validity, defendant should not be relieved from his 
support obligations thereunder, since the parties cannot 
bargain away a support obligation, particularly a future 
obligation. Should the court in turn find against plain-
tiff on both of the aforesaid matters, there can be no 
doubt that the effectiveness of the agreement terminated 
July 25, 1972, when defendant was so notified. 
POINT II. 
D E F E N D A N T SHOULD NOT BE RE-
LIEVED FROM A PORTION OF HIS SUP-
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PORT OBLIGATION ON A THEORY OF AC-
QUIESCENCE, ESTOPPEL OR LACHES. 
At the inception, it should be noted that defendant 
alleged and the court found plaintiff's acquiescence in 
only 7 months of support payments, while all cases in-
dulging an estoppel theory invariably involve many years 
of acquiescence. See 137 A. L. R. 884. 
The leading Utah Case, Larsen v. Larsen, 5 U. 2d 224 
(1956), although thoroughly emasculated by later cases, 
involved 9 years of no support payments. Even after the 
case was remanded on the theory that estoppel could be 
considered, said theory was applied to only 3 years of the 
period. Even assuming any similarity with the instant 
case, Larsen should have little effect, since French v. 
Johnson and McClure v. Dowell. 
In McClure v. Dowell, 15 U. 2d 324 (1964), the court 
rejected estoppel in a case involving non-payment of sup-
port for a 2 year period on a foreign decree as in the in-
stant case. In addition, the court limited Larsen. In 
French v. Johnson, 16 U. 2d 360 (1965), the court further 
limited Larsen in denying estoppel in a case involving 10 
years of non-payment of support. In Hall v. Hall, 7 U. 2d 
413, a 1958 case involving 5 years of non-payment, in 
which the wife thwarted the husband's efforts to pay, 
the court awarded a judgment on arrearages. 
Even if the court should consider the instant case 
as somehow even "qualifying" for consideration of an es-
toppel defense, it is well established that the defendant 
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must show that he has been materially prejudiced by the 
plaintiff's delay in asserting her rights and substantially 
changed his position in reliance thereon. Time alone will 
not support such an inference. See 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Di-
vorce and Separation §874. In the instant case, defendant 
has simply not done so, and remains, as always, in a very 
good position to discharge his obligations. As seen in 
defendant's own testimony at trial, he changed his posi-
tion very little indeed for one making from $700.00 to 
$1,066.00 per month. During the period when plaintiff 
allegedly acquiesced, defendant bought furniture at $25.60 
per month and he may have purchased a new automobile 
during the period. Even if the court properly found a 
change of position of sufficient dollar amount to support 
an estoppel, the courts of Utah have never allowed an 
obligor to avoid child support because he lived in a luxury 
apartment and had to pay for a new car. 
It is apparent that the instant case doesn't even ap-
proach the facts of those cases in which estoppel has been 
considered; but, even more clearly, defendant has cer-
tainly not changed his position sufficient to even qualify 
for application of the theory. 
Even if the court chooses to not consider the validity 
of the November 1, 1971 agreement per se, but rather 
to focus upon the agreement as evidence of plaintiff's 
conduct giving rise to defendant's theory of estoppel, it 
is apparent that the circumstances surrounding the exe-
cution of the agreement, as well as the subsequent acts 
and representations of plaintiff and her husband, in no 
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way suggests a pattern of acquiescence; and, in fact, 
would suggest that plaintiff and her husband were relying 
on defendant's representations regarding the disposition 
of the children of the parties. Plaintiff had good and 
valid reasons for not seeking to enforce defendant's sup-
port obligation, with her husband out of town for 3 months 
and defendant's prior behavior toward her. 
To carry a finding of estoppel in a case such as this 
to its logical extreme, would enable any unscrupulous 
obligor to effectively avoid his support obligations for 
any period of time, however short, by simply inducing 
the obligee to forego enforcement. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REASON-
ABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR HER EF-
FORTS TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE 
WYOMING DECREE. 
The general view is that where the court has discre-
tion to utilize equitable remedies as well as award suit 
money, said money may be awarded on a foreign judg-
ment. See 18 A. L. R. 2d 856, and there is no evidence 
in the instant case that plaintiff had any income or assets. 
The court may award suit money under 30-3-3 Utah 
Code Ann. 1953 (as amended). Further, Utah Statutes 
relating to divorce do not limit the discretion of the court 
with regard to suit money to domestic cases, and Utah 
Code Annotations are replete with cases vesting the 
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court with discretion to award suit money and none of 
those cases specifically limit said discretion to actions 
prosecuted under Utah law. 
In Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292 (1950), it was well 
established that suit money may be awarded on enforce-
ment of a foreign support decree. Further, in Oravee v» 
Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 252 P. 2d 
364 (1953), the court found upon a suit to enforce a for-
eign decree, "The superior court had jurisdiction to award 
support money for the support of the minor children, for 
attorney's fees and costs." 
It is well established that a foreign decree must be 
given full faith and credit. Finally, and, absent a showing 
to the contrary, it is presumed foreign law is similar to 
Utah law, Tolman v. Wassom, 16 U. 2d 258 (1965), Hunt 
v. Monroe, 91 P. 269 (1907). 
POINT IV. 
THE DEFENDANT INDUCED PLAINTIFF 
TO TEMPORARILY FOREGO ENFORCE-
MENT OF HIS SUPPORT OBLIGATION BY 
AGREEING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S HUS-
BAND TO ADOPT THE CHILDREN. 
It is clear from plaintiff's testimony that defendant's 
representations with regard to the children played no 
small part in her decision to give defendant a chance to 
allow her husband to adopt the children. T. 14, L. 9-17. 
Fundamental to the assertion of an estoppel is that 
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the party seeking to assert same must be acting in good 
faith, 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation §79. In the 
instant case, defendant knew full well why plaintiff had 
not sought to enforce the support obligation; and, after 
inducing her with the agreement to adopt, he refused the 
adoption and sought to rely on his own misconduct — the 
very antithesis of estoppel! 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HEARING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDG-
MENT. 
On May 25, 1973, some 18 days after trial, the court 
awarded plaintiff judgment for all arrearages and de-
fendant made a Motion To Amend on the theory that 
the court had failed to consider Larsen v. Larsen. 
Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 59, U. R. C. P., 
plaintiff's Motion does not set forth a ground thereunder 
not already considered by the court. At trial, the court 
was made well aware of Larsen v. Larsen, 5 U. 2d 224 
(1956), upon which plaintiff relied in his Motion. T. 
77, L. 28-30; T. 78, L. 1-30. While it is clear that hear-
ing and granting a Motion To Amend is discretion-
ary, that discretion may be abused when there is no 
showing of one of the grounds in Rule 59. Tangaro v. 
Marrero, 13 U. 2d 290 (1962). In the instant case, it can 
be seen that the court was made well aware of the authori-
ties relied upon by defendant at trial and made its ruling 
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in favor of plaintiff. Defendant's Motion To Amend, then, 
was improper because defendant was simply asking for 
reconsideration of his case. 
Further, as the facts indicate, the court's ruling on 
defendant's Motion was made a full 52 days after trial. 
Without benefit of transcript, it would be unreasonable 
as a matter of law to attribute to the court any indepen-
dent recollection of evidence taken in a 2% hour trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff should have judgment for all support arrear-
ages as a matter of law, and attorney's fees, or that fail-
ing, a new trial on the following grounds: 
1. The agreement purporting to relieve defendant 
of his child support obligation is invalid both as a con-
tract and to effectuate a release of future support. 
2. Defendant is not entitled to relief from a portion 
of his support obligation on a theory of acquiescence, es-
toppel or laches, since plaintiff did nothing upon which 
defendant could reasonably rely and defendant did not 
act in good faith. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees 
for her efforts to enforce the terms of the Wyoming De-
cree, because it was necessary that plaintiff enforce said 
Decree and she was without funds to compensate counsel. 
4. Defendant induced plaintiff to forego enforce-
ment of his obligation. 
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5. The Court improperly amended the original Judg-
ment entered on behalf of plaintiff for her full support 
obligation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES Z. DAVIS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1101 First Security Bank Bldg, 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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